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Introduction
Tesco and Morrisons adopted
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and its policies set
forth in International Accounting Standards (IAS) on their year-end 2006
financial performance for the first time (Tesco 2006 p. 46; Morrisons 2006
p. 8). This is a very interesting development on the part of the two
companies as they situate their respective FS side-by-side IAS. Due to
this, they can now be referred as few firms that make and issue fair
presentation regarding their FS as set forth in IAS 1 (IAS Plus 2006).
This paper will examine this reporting shift on the matters of how much
are their compliance and analyze how it affects that ability of each
company’s FS as well as IAS provisions to provide useful financial
information to a wide range of users and stakeholders which have business
and other relations with each company.
Importance of FS
Financial statements (FS)
provides an overview on how managerial decision-making drives an entity to
attainment of each stakeholder’s goals. With such information,
stakeholders will be able to execute economic decisions in accordance to
what FS indicate and its implications to stakeholder’s future relationship
with the entity. Aside from being a decision-making and
managerial-monitoring tool, FS are also used to interpret contracts or
agreements in which the performance or position of an entity is of utmost
concern (WSU 2006). Perhaps, a credit agency or a certain regulatory body
closely examines the entity and appraise it based on an authentic FS. As
observed, the presence of FS implicates indefinite number of advantages
not only for a firm but also for the whole business community and public
at large.
Level of Compliance between Tesco and
Morrisons
In terms of format, consolidated income statement of Tesco complies more
diligently with IAS 1 (IAS Plus 2006) compared against Morrisons. The
latter states turnover instead of revenues, raw materials and consumables
instead of cost of sales and did not classify the profit (loss) for the
period according to equity holders of the parent and minority interests
(p. 38). In SORIE, Morrisons (p. 38) disclosed very little accounts while
Tesco (p. 43) completed the requirements. In addition, the former located
profit for the year in the beginning of the SORIE. This can be primarily
the evidence that the former really did not have major concerns regarding
IFRS shift (p. 8) but nonetheless affects how stakeholders view its FS.
With regards to balance sheet, both companies have the same level of
compliance with IAS 1. The two
companies exemplified compliance with its structure having split accounts
(current/ non-current), presentation of liquidity (net current assets/
liabilities) and having a new account such as “assets/ liabilities held
for sales” (IAS Plus 2006). However, the difference is in the signatories
that certify the authenticity of their respective balance sheets. In the
required format (IAS Plus 2006), at least one Director of the company
should have the signature reflected but Morrisons failed to comply with
this as it only have as signatories its CEO and finance officer (p. 39).
In terms of cash flows, both companies complied diligently. Back to
income statement, it is noticeable that Tesco did not provide depreciation
expense while Morrisons reflected this. The former showed this on the
“notes” but its use of functional-form should have at least minimum
accounts relating to depreciation, amortization and staff costs on the
face of income statement as stated in IAS 1 (IAS Plus 2006).
The most noticeable of all in terms of
format is that Morrisons situated accounting policies as a prelude to
numerical figures of FS (pp. 35-37). This includes the basis for
collating, analyzing and computing FS accounts and other consolidated
figures. Although may find its merit as an good indicator that users can
rely at the start of FS inspection, this format is not what is required by
IAS 1 as well as IAS 39 (IAS Plus 2006). Morrisons also presented their
FS with figures showing the 2005 and 2006 financial results of the company
accounting and not accounting for Safeway Integration which is said to be
its biggest corporate move (pp. 1-2). On the part of Tesco, despite its
continued growth in the UK, did not present its FS this way rather in
consolidation.
Especially the need to cross-reference
them to appropriate accounts (IAS Plus 2006), notes are very useful in
disclosing information that may not fit in the face of certain
consolidated FS. Both companies use notes all throughout their
presentations. There is also no account such as “extra ordinary items in
the income statements” which is prohibited under IAS 1. Morrisons did not
follow the suggested format for notes that they should be non-fragmentized
(IAS Plus 2006). The revenue notes of Morrisons reflected the face amount
of revenues in the income statement (p. 41) while Tesco reflected its
result for the year (p. 53) with regards to its continuing operations.
This disclosure stance indicates how Tesco would hinder information
pertaining to the attributes of its revenues without data regarding fuel,
VAT and third party shares which is possessed by Morrisons.
Both companies provide comparative data
for 2005 and 2006 performance including the time-frame in which they are
accounted for (Tesco pp. 42-45; Morrisons pp. 38-40). This is compliance
regarding the reporting of any period changes in making FS (IAS Plus
2006). In the contrary, Morrisons erred to apply IAS 32 and 39 to reflect
changes in accounting policy with regards to equity holders and minority
interest. Since financial instruments are the tool of every competitive
firm, it is hard to think that Morrisons do not have any. In the part of
Tesco (p. 100), its compliance to IAS 32 and 39 is tarnished of the
absence of comparative figures as it is not required to first-time
adopters (IAS Plus 2006).
Both companies did not write in the
face of balance sheet the number of authorized shares and their par value
which in turn located in their notes (pp. 84-85; pp. 52-55). In this
aspect, Morrison complied not only in presenting such information but also
the company somehow disclosed information regarding the rights and
restrictions from the turnover of shares as stated in IAS 1. For example,
“the Group has yet to fair valued grants of the options from the
acquisition of Safeway (p. 54)” which means that Morrisons wanted to
simplify the decision-making of investors by offering its own analysis.
In a negative note, Tesco has several motions for buyback programs and
share option schemes (p. 84) that undermining IAS 1 can cause investor
distrust of its consequences.
The initial concern of IAS 8,
that is the disclosure of any significant changes in accounting policy, is
fulfilled by the two companies (p. 46; p. 8). Further, Morrisons used
before-Safeway integration and after-Safeway integration entities which
are compliance with IAS 1 concerning separation of accounts (IAS Plus
2006). Due to this, Tesco erred in adopting single-entity presentation
for a consolidated FS which is heavily guided by managerial judgment. IAS
8 allows managerial judgment to be applied in determining appropriate and
practical accounting policy (IAS Plus 2006). But this should be adopted
with accounting policies in mind. In the case of Tesco, although there is
IAS 1 that prohibits consolidation, it opted to use managerial judgment
without policy priority and thus erred in this respect.
Since the firm adopted IFRS
officially only recently, it is a must for retrospection as set forth in
IAS 8 for the purpose of comparative figures across years (IAS Plus
2006). Retrospection means applying IFRS provisions to the earliest and
most practical year (IAS Plus 2006). However, the same IFRS provisions
made companies to deter some comparative merits in their reports like
applying IAS 32 and 39 which allows one year exemption (in the case of
Tesco) and discharge of retrospection of financial instruments (in the
case of Morrisons). In this regard, Morrisons reflect the most comparable
historical amounts between the two since it had retrospect as far as year
ended 2004 while Tesco only retrospect on year end 2005.
In disclosing changes in
accounting estimates, Tesco’s overuse of managerial judgment in accordance
in withdrawing the use of available regulatory provisions disrupted its
level of compliance. IAS 8 merely provides managerial judgment as last
resource for entities and not to use as strategic tool to raise individual
goals (IAS Plus 2006). On the part of Morrisons, they also dragged into
the error of Tesco as there are no citations relating to IFRS (pp. 46-52)
or other pronouncement regarding the framework used in establishing
estimates. This undermined the earlier upper hand of Morrisons when in
comes to comparative historic performance as the estimates that primarily
affects almost all significant entries (e.g. revenues, taxation, financing
costs) are frame using managerial judgments (pp. 35-37).
Further, prior period errors
are presented implicitly without each firm citing that there existed
inability to conform to IFRS provisions in the past although regulations
are already existing (IAS Plus 2006). These implicit errors are presented
in their respective notes (pp. 91-95; pp. 63-65). As observed, both firms
concerns their restatements in the year-ended 2005 figures as well as
accounts pertaining to profits and changes in equity. Morrison’s earlier
admonition that IFRS adoption is not greatly affected their FS and their
performance is misleading because transition to IFRS from UK GAAP resulted
to a reduction in the bottom-line profit by £100M (p. 63). The error is
not only made implicit but rather false. On the part of Tesco, the IFRS
shift showed minimal effect. Perhaps, this position of Morrisons is the
cause of the company deflecting most of provisional exemptions and
requirements apart from Tesco as shown by comparative compliance with IFRS
provision in the “reconciliation to equity” (pp. 92-95; pp. 64-65).
In disclosing changes in
accounting estimates, Tesco’s overuse of managerial judgment in accordance
in withdrawing the use of available regulatory provisions disrupted its
level of compliance. IAS 8 merely provides managerial judgment as last
resource for entities and not to use as strategic tool to raise individual
goals (IAS Plus 2006). On the part of Morrisons, they also dragged into
the error of Tesco as there are no citations relating to IFRS (pp. 46-52)
or other pronouncement regarding the framework used in establishing
estimates. This undermined the earlier upper hand of Morrisons when in
comes to comparative historic performance as the estimates that primarily
affects almost all significant entries (e.g. revenues, taxation, financing
costs) are frame using managerial judgments (pp. 35-37).
Further, prior period errors
are presented implicitly without each firm citing that there existed
inability to conform to IFRS provisions in the past although regulations
are already existing (IAS Plus 2006). These implicit errors are presented
in their respective notes (pp. 91-95; pp. 63-65). As observed, both firms
concerns their restatements in the year-ended 2005 figures as well as
accounts pertaining to profits and changes in equity. Morrison’s earlier
admonition that IFRS adoption is not greatly affected their FS and their
performance is misleading because transition to IFRS from UK GAAP resulted
to a reduction in the bottom-line profit by £100M (p. 63). The error is
not only made implicit but rather false. On the part of Tesco, the IFRS
shift showed minimal effect. Perhaps, this position of Morrisons is the
cause of the company deflecting most of provisional exemptions and
requirements apart from Tesco as shown by comparative compliance with IFRS
provision in the “reconciliation to equity” (pp. 92-95; pp. 64-65).
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